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Racetrack Betting: Do Bettors Understand the Odds?
Abstract
'!'here is considerable literature which concludes that the average person does not understand elementary
probability and statistics (Tversky 1971 ). In one experiment of this type subjects were asked whether a family
of 6 children born in the order GBGBBG was more or less likely than one in which the birth order was
BGBBBB. About 80% chose the first sequence in spite of the fact that both are approximately equally likely,
with the second actually being slightly more probable since male births are slightly more common.
This experiment, like most in the field~ is based on questions asked of subjects in a controlled, artificial
setting. A naturally occurring setting in which the subjects have a continuing stake in the outcome is a
potentially better way to determine whether or not the public understands probability. Examples of such
settings are racetracks and stock markets. Racetracks provide the simpler arena; the choice of actions is more
restricted and one can bet only for events, not against them as is possible in short selling on the stock market.
We therefore analyzed racetrack betting in an attempt to discover the patrons' betting savvy, and we looked
only at the simplest type of bet - bets on a horse to win.
Our first assumption is that bettors attempt to win money. Our second one is that they have an internal
perception of which horse will win a given race. This perception results in their personal, subjective
probability for the outcome of the race. We want to know whether this personal probability has any basis in
reality.
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'!'here is considerable literature which concludes that the average person does not 
understand elementary probability and statistics (Tversky 1971 ). In one experiment 
of this type subjects were asked whether a family of 6 children born in the order 
GBGBBG was more or less likely than one in which the birth order was BGBBBB. 
About 80% chose the first sequence in spite of the fact that both are approximately 
equally likely, with the second actually being slightly more probable since male 
births are slightly more common. 
This experiment, like most in the field~ is based on questions asked of subjects in 
a controlled, artificial setting. A naturally occurring setting in which the subjects 
have a continuing stake in the outcome is a potentially better way to determine 
whether or not the public understands probability. Examples of such settings are 
racetracks and stock markets. Racetracks provide the simpler arena; the choice 
of actions is more restricted and one can bet only for events, not against them as 
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is possible in short selling on the stock market. We therefore analyzed racetrack 
betting in an attempt to discover the patrons' betting savvy, and we looked only 
at the simplest type of bet - bets on a horse to win. 
Our first assumption is that bettors attempt to win money. Our second one is 
that they have an internal perception of which horse will win a given race. This 
perception results in their personal, subjective probability for the outcome of the 
race. We want to know whether this personal probability has any basis in reality. 
Efficient Markets 
H these personal probabilities are realistic then an efficient betting market would 
result. In such a market the money bet on each horse is an accurate reflection of the 
actual odds that horse has of v.rin.ning. So, the distribution of bets is determined 
by the bettors subjective probabilities (in a way to be explained later). Thus the 
mathematical definition of an efficient betting market is that the subjective odds are 
equal to the objective odds. 
If a race track betting market is not efficient, there could be three explanations. 
First, the bettors may not have an accurate perception of which horse will win a 
given race, and so they do not bet on the horses optimally. Second, bettors do have 
an accurate perception of how likely a horse is to win, but they do not understand 
how to bet based on that information. Lastly, bettors could have accurate personal 
probabilities in mind, but they value their profits in a nonstandard way. 
In order to investigate the betting market we gathered data to determine whether 
subjective odds are indeed equal to objective ones. Before describing what we found, 
let us review the way in which racetrack betting operates. 
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Racetrack Betting 
Consider a race with just three horses for simplicity. See Table 1. Suppose 
$5,000, $2,000 and $1,000 respectively have been bet on the three horses to win. 
So, $8,000 is the total pool. H the racetrack "take" is the typical 18% then the 
amount available for payoff is $8000 x (1 - .18) = $8000 x .82 = $6560. H the 
first horse wins then the amount returned on each $1 bet is ~~·~~ = $1.25, etc., and 
the profit on that $1 bet is $0.25. (Newspapers generally publish the payoff on a 
$2 bet so if "Reality" won this race the published payoff would be $2.50 to win. 
Also, the track usually rounds the numbers in the last column of Table 1 down to 
the nearest 5¢, and pockets the difference, called "breakager. . Thus, if "Optimism'" 
were to win, the payoff would be $3.25 on $1.00 ( = $6.50 on $2.00) instead of $3.28 
as shown in the table). 
Col.l 
Horse's Kame Amount Bet ($) 
Reality 
Optimum 
Fantasy 
5000 
2000 
1000 
Col.2 
$ After Removing 
Track Take 
t = .18 
8000 6560 = 8000(1- .18) 
Col.3 Col.4 
S Payoff on a $ Profit on a 
$1 Bet $1 Bet 
6560 - 1 25 
5000 - • 
6560 3 28 2oOo = . 
6560 6 56 iOOo = . 
.25 
2.28 
5.56 
Table 1: Computation of Payoffs 
Now suppose the bettor's subjective odds were~, fs, fs respectively on the three 
horses. Then the expected payoffs from a $1 bet would be calculated as shown in 
Table 2. 
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Col.1 Col.2 Col.3 
$Payoff Subjective Expected 
(See Table 1) Probability $Payoff 
(Hypothetical) 
Reality 1.25 3/ 4 .94 (= 1.25 X~ ) 
Optimism 3.28 3/16 .62 ( = 3.28 X 1
3
6 ) 
Fantasy 6.56 1/16 .44 ( = 6.56 X 1
1
6 ) 
Table 2: Calculation of Expected Payoffs 
Note that the largest expected payoff in Table 2 is .94 on "Reality." At the 
racetrack the information in Table 1 becomes available as the betting proceeds. If 
our hypothetical bettor sees the information in Table 1 as he proceeds to the betting 
window, then he/she will naturally bet on "Reality." This will raise the amount 
bet on that horse. As further bettors place their bets the amounts in Column 1 in 
Table 1 should grow in such a way that the expected payoffs in Column 3 of Table 
2 are all equal. 
An Al&ebraic Formula for the Subjective Probabilities 
All this can be expressed algebraically. Let Ai denote the amount bet on horse 
i. Let D denote the pool after removing the track take, as shown at the bottom of 
Column 2, Table 1. 
Let P, denote the payoffs on the respective horses (Col. 3, Table 1) and let Si 
denote the respective subjective odds (Col.2, Table 2). Then Pi = D/Ai and 
a.t equilibrium all expected payoffs are equal, so that 
(1) 
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Since the Si are probabilities they add to 1, and a little algebra yields that "con-
stant" = tDA; = 1- t, and 
(2) 
(A minor adjustment in the above reasoning is needed to take into account the 
track breakage. For this purpose one can algebraically compute the actual track 
take, including breakage, from the values of P; as 
1 
T=l---1 . I: P; 
It is this value which has been used in the analysis of data reported below.) 
The Data 
We recorded the payoff for each horse in 5500 races, and converted these pay-
offs to subjective probabilities as described above. These probabilities were then 
grouped into intervals. The intervals were chosen so that an approximately equal 
number of horses fell into each category. For instance, the interval of subjective 
probabilities [0.091, 0.1) contained 1376 horses. The average subjective probability 
for this category was .0954. 
There were 111 winners in this category. Thus the objective probability for this 
category was N716 = .0807. 
(Actually, although 5500 races were typed into the computer for analysis only 
about 80% of these races were used. We discarded any race whose total take, T, 
was outside of the interval [.165, .21) since the racetrack takes generally vary from 
.17 to .19. We assumed that the dat.a on any race whose take fell outside of this 
interval contained a typographical error.) 
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These subjective and objective probabilit ies provide mathematical quantities 
which we can compare. The subjective probabilities are related to the money bet 
and the objective ones are a reflection of reality. As mentioned previously if these 
quantities correspond the market is efficient. In the interval (0.091, 0.1) discussed 
above these two quantities are nearly equal, though not exactly so (.0954 vs .0807). 
subjective number of average objective 
probability horses subjective probability 
probability 
[0, 0.012) 1335. 0.00865025 0.00524345 
[0.012, 0.021 ) 2357. 0.0166076 0.0101824 
[0.021, 0.025) 1067. 0.023029 0.0229991 
[0.025, 0.032) 1936. 0.0284558 0.0227273 
[0.032, 0.038) 1512. 0.0349155 0.0271164 
[0.038, 0.044) 1404. 0.0409321 0.0306268 
[0.044, 0.05) 1334. 0.0469316 0.0517241 
(0, 05, 0.058) 1697. 0.0540726 0.0465527 
[0.058, 0.066) 1540. 0.0619449 0.0603896 
[0.066, 0.075) 1635. 0.0705189 0.0654434 
[0.075, 0.083) 1401. 0.0789255 0.0735189 
[0.083, 0.091 ) 1295. 0.0869364 0.0803089 
[0.091,0.1) 1376. 0.0954372 0.0806686 
[0.1, 0.1125) 1750. 0.106015 0.0977143 
[0.1125, 0.125) 1583. 0.118743 0.123816 
(0.125, 0.1375) 1393. 0.13134 0.122039 
(0.1375, 0.15) 1228. 0.14397 0.138436 
[0.15, 0.1675) 1625. 0.158536 0.160615 
[0.1675, 0.185) 1469. 0.175819 0.184479 
[0.185, 0.2) 1084. 0.192217 0.200185 
[0.2, 0.225) 1502. 0.211831 0.221704 
[0.225, 0.25) 1323. 0.237378 0.252457 
[0.25, 0.2875) 1283. 0.267602 0.268901 
[0.2875, 0.35) 1378. 0.314537 0.344702 
(0.35, 1.00) 1472. 0.421119 0.444293 
Table 3: Betting Data 
Table 3 contains the results we obtained. A good way to see whether subjective 
and objective probabilities correspond is to plot one versus the other. This is done 
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in Figure 1. The line superimposed on the plot is the 45 degree line corresponding 
to a perfect match between subjective and objective odds. Our first impression 
from this table and matching plot is that t he 45° line fits the data quite well. That 
is: Race track bettor$ do a creditable job of prediction. 
0 
b 
e 
c 
t 
v 
e 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
-0.0 
-0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 
subjective 
Figure 1: Betting Data, with 45° Line 
0.4 
(Data structurally similar to that in Table 3 and Figure 1 has been reported 
before. For the best summary see Asch and Qua.nd't (1986). Those earlier results 
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show a somewhat larger deviation from the 459 line than do ours. It is not dear 
to us that the data in f'axlier studies was edited in order to remove the noticeable 
percentage of fiawed result (T ¢ ( .17, .21 )), nor adjusted to take account of track 
breakage. 
Furthermore, the analyses reported in the remainder of our article require com-
plete results, and not just summaries like Table 3, and such complete results from 
earlier studies were not available to us.) 
Of course, the points in Figure 1 do not lie exactly on the 45° line. Their 
departure from a perfect relat ionship is emphasized in Figure 2 which plots log 
(objective probabilities) versus log (subjective probabilities). 
Reasons have been suggested for p<•trons to bet less on favorit·es than they should 
and more on longshots than they should. cs~ the discussion of utility, below; and 
also Asch and Quandt (1986).) The result of such a bias for longshots over favorites 
would be as follows: 
Where the subjective probabilities are high (favorites) the objective 
probabilities would be even higher (i.e., above the 45° line). Thus these 
subjective probabilities underestimate the corresponding objective ones. 
Symmetrically, where the subjective probabilities are low (longshots) the 
objective probabilities would be even lower (i.e., below the 45° line). 
Such a pattern can be detected in Figures 1 and 2 since the objective probabilities 
generally lie below the 45° line at the left and above it at the right. 
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L 
0 
G 
·0.5 
·1 .0 
0 -1. 5 
b 
·2 .0 
·2.0 - 1.5 - 1.0 -0.5 
LOGsbj 
Figure 2: Betting Data expressed in Logs, with 45° Line 
A Linear Relationship for the Longshot/Favorite Bias? 
The next step in our analysis was to test the significance of this apparent 
longshots-over-favorites bias. Thus we performed a statistical analysis to deter-
mine whether the pattern we observed could have occurred by chance if there were 
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no real longshot/favorite bias among the general betting public. In this case, the 
deviation we observed from the 45° line would be simply a chance accident. Such a 
test required us to specify alternative models for the relationship between the ob-
jective and subjective probabilities. Thus we tested the null hypothesis of equality 
versus three increasingly complex alternative possibilities. The simplest of these 
alternatives was that of a linear relationship other than the null relationship of 
equality. Symbolically, the hypotheses were 
H0 : obj = subj 
H 11 : obj = ao + a1 (subj) 
These hypotheses were tested by a method involving the Chi-squared statistic. 
This method took into account the varying number of horses in each race as well as 
the fact that there is a relation of dependence among the objective outcomes. (For 
example, if Reality wins then Fantasy loses. ) The test results can be sununarized in 
a stepwise table, analogous to that encountered in a stepwise analysis of variance. 
The results are summarized in Table 4. 
Alternative Hypothesis Sum of Squares Null Distribution P-value 
H 11 (but not Ho ) 20.31 xi < .0001 
H12 (but not H 11 ) 2.38 xi 0.13 
H13 (but not H12 ) 2.32 xi 0.13 
Remainder 12.95 2 X21 0.91 
Total 37.96 0.04 
Table 4: Hypothesis Tests 
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Note· that the P-value for H11 but not H0 is extremely small ( < .0001). This 
means that the sample could not plausibly have occurred if only H 0 were true, and 
leaves us to conclude that H 11 is a better description of the true situation. The 
corresponding linear relation which best fits the data is 
(3) obj = - 0.0067 + 1.1165 x subj. 
Figure 3 shows the data of Figure 1 and also this line. Note that as conjectured 
this line is close to the 45° line, but is very slightly below it when the subjective 
probabilities are small and somewhat above it when they are large. 
0.4 
0.3 
0 
b 
e 
c 
0.2 
t 
v 
e 
0.1 
-0.0 
·0.0 0.1 0 .2 0.3 0.4 
subjective 
Figure 3: Betting Data. with Linear Fit (3). 
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The remaining P-values in the body of Table 4 are not small. Thus a quadratic 
(H12 ) or cubic (H13 ) curve does not seem a significantly more accurate expression 
of reality than the above lineax curve. In addition, the large (and hence, insignif-
icant) P-value associated with the "Remainder" term is an indication that there 
is no other significant, simple relation between subj. and obj. (The x2 statistic 
and P-value associated with the "Total" in Table 4 reflects the effect of all pos-
sible alternatives to H0 . This P-value is fairly small because the linear equation 
corresponding to H 11 is a much better explanation of the data than is H 0 .) 
In conclusion: 
There appea1·$ to be a smalllongshot over favorite bias. It can be reasonably well 
described by tht~ linear equation (9 ). 
An Explanation from Utility Theory 
Thus far in our analysis we have attempted to document and quantify the long-
shot/favorite bias. Now let us tum to a possible explanation for it. We will look at 
the third reason why a racetrack may be inefficient as expressed above; the bettors 
may value their winnings in a nonstandard way. 
Why should bettors opt to overbet on horses that are unlikely to win. It has 
been conjectured that the large payoffs on these bets offer something more than 
monetary satisfaction; they offer excitement. (See e.g. Asch and Quandt (1986) 
or Thaler (1992).) A bettor would thus prefer to net $100 from a lucky bet on a 
longshot than to net ten $10 payoffs from bets on favorites. A payoff on a favorite 
lacks excitement. A utility function can put this excitement into mathematical 
terms. The utility function u (payoff) estimates the amount of satisfaction a bettor 
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gets from a particular payoff. 
A bettor with utility function u (payoff) should bet so that at equilibrium 
(4) u(Pi)Si =constant (for all i). 
(Compare (4) to (1) and note that they agree when u(Pi) = Pi.) Algebra now 
yields 
(5) 
1- T' 
Si = u(Pi) where ' 1 T = 1- 1 L u (Pi) 
at equilibrium as the new version of (2). 
This was the starting point for deriving a likelihood ratio test that tested 
Ho:u(P) =P 
vs. H1 :u(P)=a+bP. 
The appropriate x2 statistic has one degree of freedom, and turned out to be 18.3. 
This has a P-value < 0.001, and so is highly significant. It thus appears that 
one explanation for the results in Table 1 is that bettors behave according to a 
nonstandard utility. Based on our likelihood analysis, the best estimate for this 
utility is the linear form 
(5) u(P) =-.58+ P. 
Note that Pis the payoff on a winning Sl bet and so is always bigger than 1. Thus 
in the three horse race of Table 1 the payoffs on the three horses are in the ratio 
i : ! : 1 = 2 : 5: 10 but the utilities under (5) are in the ratio .67: 2.7: 5.98::::: 2 : 
8.1 : 18. 
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Which Explanation is Correct? 
You may note that three different explanations have now been implicitly pro-
posed for the deviation from 45° in Figure 1 and its associated Table 3. One is 
that bettors do not quite correctly evaluate horses abilities. Another is that they 
do but that they do not quite know how to use these evaluations to determine their 
bets. The third explanation is that they are behaving intelligently, but according 
to a utility function such as (5) rather than the more usual u(P) = P. It appears 
that some new data of a different sort would be needed to evaluate which - if any 
-of these explanations is correct. You might want to speculate what data would 
be needed, and how it could be effectively gathered. 
The Last-Race Phenomenon 
It has been suggested (Ziemba and Hausch ( 1987)) that bettors bet differently 
during the last race of the day. This makes sense, since by the end of the day, most 
people have lost money. Perhaps they feel that the best way to earn back that 
money is to bet on longshots, since they provide a quick high profit. Therefore, one 
would expect to find the longshot/favorite bias more pronounced during the last 
race of the day. 
The results for the last race of the day are summarized in Table 5, Figure 4, and 
Table 6. The data does point somewhat in the direction of a longshotjfavorite bias. 
Indeed, the underbetting on favorites appears more pronounced than in the data for 
all races. On the other hand there seems to be very little overbetting on longshots. 
None of the hypothesis tests in Table 6 are significant. (I.e., All P-values are above 
.05.) This lack of significance may be because there is no longshot/favorite bias 
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here or because the sample size here is much smaller than that in Table 3, and so 
is not large enough to confirm the bias which does exist. 
0 
b 
e 
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t 0.2 
v 
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-0.0 
-0.0 0.1 0.2 0 . 3 
subjective 
0.4 
FigU.re 4: Data for the Last Race of the D;1y, with 45° Line 
0.5 
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subjective number of average objective 
probability horses subjective probability 
probability 
[0, 0.032) 1012 0.01889 0.01779 
[0.032, 0.044) 390 0.03786 0.02308 
[0.044, 0.058) 343 0.05091 0.04956 
[0.058, 0.075) 359 0.06611 0.06407 
[0.075, 0.091) 355 0.0826 0.0873 
[0.091, 0.1125) 349 0.1013 0.1003 
[0.1125, 0.1375) 336 0.1248 0.1250 
[0.1375, 0.1675) 291 0.1515 0.1100 
[0.1675, 0.2) 264 0.1827 0.1591 
[0.2, 0.25) 266 0.2236 0.2481 
[0.25, 0.35) 264 0.2912 0.3295 
[0.35, 1.00) 95 0.4065 0.4947 
Table 5: Results for the Last Race of the Day 
Alternative Sum of Squares Null Distribution P-value 
Hypothesis 
H 11 (but not H 0 ) 2.42 X~ 0.12 
H 12 (but not H 11 ) 3.58 X~ 0.06 
H13 {but not H 12 ) 0.56 X~ 0.46 
Remainder 8.22 X~ 0.42 
Total 13.88 2 Xu 0.25 
Table 6: Hypothesis Tests for the Last Race of the Day 
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